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Summary 
An empirical flow model of the Dutch labour market is used to simulate the effects of 
autonomous labour demand and supply shocks on employment and unemployment. A 
positive labour supply shock, representing a policy which aims at enhancing labour 
participation, appears to lead to more employment indeed, but the effect is rather small. 
A sensitivity analysis using the model shows that a string of positive and negative labour 
supply shocks generates unemployment persistence, which depends upon the degree of 
unemployment duration dependence and upon the level of labour market dynamics. This 
corroborates the theoretical predictions, but the sensitivity for specification changes 
appears to be small. 
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1. Introduction 
Today, low labour participation is a major economie problem in The Netherlands. The 
extent of the problem is illustrated by the dramatic rise of die ratio between the number 
of workers and those receiving government benefits in the past twenty years. In 1970 
this ratio was less than 0.5 so that more than two workers earned the benefit of each 
person receiving such benefit. However, in 1990 the ratio nas risen to over 0.8 so that 
each worker nas to earn almost a full benefit of another person. Both politicians and 
academies have proposed a number of practical policy measures in order to curb this 
development (see e.g. WRR, 1990). Most proposals aim at enhancing labour participa-
tion by a reduction of the eligibility for social security, or by stimulating labour supply 
in an other way. However, the main policy problem with respect to these proposals is 
whether or not they stimulate employment indeed. 
This paper gives a model based analysis of this policy problem, by using the flow 
approach of modelling the labour market. According to a traditional model of the labour 
market with fixed prices, with employment determined by labour demand, a positive 
labour supply shock will not result in more employment, but will only lead to more 
involuntary unemployment. Hence, according to this model labour supply incentives do 
not lead to more labour participation (defined as total employment divided by total 
working age population). However, traditional models of the labour market disregard 
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labour market dynamics, i.e. the size of the flows into and out of employment and 
unemployment. From a policy point of view it can make much difference whether each 
year 20% of the employed lose their jobs and the same number of new jobs is created 
so that employment remains constant or that, under constant employment, there is job 
destruction and job creation at a pace of only, say, 5% of the total number of jobs. 
Thus the main academie (or technical problem) of the paper is the construction of an 
empirical model of labour market dynamics for The Netherlands, which describes all 
flows relevant for the policy analysis of a labour supply shock. The model is an 
extended version of the model of Den Butter and Van Ours (1992). It is strongly 
inspired by the flow approach to labour markets as portrayed by Blanchard and 
Diamond (1992). At the core of the model is a matching function of unemployed and 
vacancies, which determines the flow out of unemployment and specifies the search 
process of employers and employees. 
The next section gives a graphical illustration of the consequences of a labour supply 
shock according to different models of the labour market and illustrates the importance 
of considering the position and determinants of the UV-curve when such (policy 
induced) shock occurs. A UV-curve can be derived from the aggregate transaction curve 
in case of a heterogeneous labour market, but altematively as the result of the search 
and matching processes at the labour market, even is if this market is homogeneous. 
The flow approach and hence the remainder of the paper nas the latter theoretical 
background. Section 3 presents a full model of labour market flows and shows how the 
model is calibrated for The Netherlands. Section 4 presents the results of impulse 
simulations using the model. A sensitivity analysis reveals to what extent, according to 
alternative model specifications, a labour supply shock indeed enhances employment. 
This section also considers asymmetrie effects of negative and positive labour demand 
shocks, in order to investigate whether the model generates persistence of unemploy-
ment if the escape probability from unemployment is duration dependent. Finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
2. Demand effects of enhanced labour supply 
Figure 1 shows the effects of a policy directed at enhancing labour supply in case of a 
homogeneous labour market in a simple demand and supply diagram. The effects 
depend on whether the labour market is in equilibrium or not. In equilibrium with 
market clearing wages we start with labour demand equal to the labour supply so that 
total employment is Le with equilibrium wage we. Now policy incentives lead to a 
supply shock, represented by a shift of the labour supply curve to the right. (Ls -> 
Ls'). A new equilibrium is reached at a higher level of employment and at lower wages. 
Hence, in case of labour market equilibrium a policy directed at enhancing labour 
supply leads to more employment indeed. However, when wages are fixed and are 
above the equilibrium level (wf) we have in the initial situation employment determined 
by labour demand (Ldf) and unemployment equal to 
Uf = Lsf-Ldf 
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Now a shift of the labour supply curve to the right does not lead to more employment, 
but only to more unemployment: 
U f = L s f - L d f > Uf 
The figure illustrates two extreme situations. In The Netheriands the labour market is 
characterized by disequilibrium with sticky (not fixed) wages where the Phillips-curve 
effect of a labour supply shock will induce a small reduction of wages, so that employ-
ment slightly rises. 
Yet, the assumption of a homogeneous labour market may not be not realistic. There-
fore figure 2 shows the effects of a labour supply shock in a heterogeneous market 
under the extreme assumption of labour market disequilibrium with fixed wages. Now 
total employment is determined by the aggregate transaction curve, which is the sum of 
employment at the micro markets in disequilibrium. Wfaen wages are above equilibrium 
at the macro level, the majority of these markets will suffer a demand constraint, but 
some of these markets will have a supply constraint. Therefore, total employment is 
always smaller according to the aggregate transaction curve than according to the short 
side of the aggregated labour market (i.e. employment equal to labour demand when 
wages are above equilibrium and equal to labour supply when wages are below equilib-
rium). 
Figure 1 Labour supply shock in a homogeneous labour market 
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Figure 2 starts with wages above equilibrium. Total employment is equal to L4f whereas 
for unemployment holds 
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Uf = Lsf - Ldf 
Figure 2 shows how in case of a heterogeneous labour market vacancies and unemploy-
ment co-exist. With labour supply curve Ls and fixed wages wf, vacancies are equal to 
Vf = Ld - Ldf 
The graph shows that when wages are at their equilibrium level the number of vacancies 
is equal to the number of unemployed. This is frictional unemployment. When wages 
rise above equilibrium level the number of vacancies decreases and the number of 
unemployed increases. Hence the ratio of unemployed and vacancies can be regarded as 
an indicator of how much the labour market is out of equilibrium. 
Figure 2 Labour supply shock in a heterogeneous labour market 
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When the policy to enhance labour participation leads to a shift of the labour supply 
curve from Ls to Lr' the aggregate transaction curve will also shift to the right. Now, 
with wages still fixed at wf, employment rises from Ldf to Ldf. Because of this labour 
supply shock unemployment becomes much larger: 
Uf = Lsf - Ldf, 
whereas the number of vacancies declines: 
Vf = Ld - Ldf 
So we see that, unlike in the case of a homogeneous labour market, in a heterogenous 
labour market a labour supply shock induces some additional employment, when wages 
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are fixed and above equilibrium level. A major lesson from this graph is that the 
employment effects of a policy directed at enhancing labour supply depends on the 
shape and the position of the aggregate transaction curve. At first sight it seems that this 
position can easily be determined empirically, when data on total unemployment and on 
the number of vacancies are available and when the aggregate transaction curve is 
identified as the well-known UV-curve. 
However, modem search theory provides quite another theoretical underpinning of the 
UV-curve. Here the UV-curve is determined by the matching process at the labour 
market, where job seekers and employers meet. This matching process is described by a 
matching function or haring function according to which the flow of new jobs depends 
on the stock of unemployed and the stock of vacancies. Yet, in this matching function 
not all unemployed necessarily have the same weight: the probability for a long-term 
unemployed to escape from unemployment may be much lower than that for a short-
term unemployed. In this case of duration dependence with respect to unemployment, 
the position of the UV-curve does not only depend on the number of vacancies and of 
unemployed, but also on the composition of the unemployed.2 Moreover, a search 
equilibrium does not neccesarily imply that the number of vacancies be equal to the 
number of unemployed (corrected for heterogeneity) but may also occur with unequal 
numbers of unemployed and vacancies (see Pissarides, 1990). 
From this viewpoint we need to analyze labour market flows and labour market 
dynamics in order to assess the success of a policy of enhancing labour supply. The 
traditional modelling of the labour market in macroeconomic policy models which only 
consider stocks, does not provide adequate information for such assessment. This 
traditional (disequilibrium) modelling of the labour market can be summarized in an 
archetypical way as follows: 
Labour demand (stock): Ld = Ld ( ) 
Labour supply (stock): L, = L, ( ) 
Unemployment: U = L, - 1^ , 
where total labour demand and total labour supply are determined by behaviourial 
equations with unenmloyment the difference between supply and demand. 
The stylized version of the dynamic labour market model with stocks and flows, reads 
as follows: 
Unemployment: U, = U,., + F," - Ft°" 
Flow out of unemployment: F0" = f (U,V) (matching function) 
Flow into unemployment: F™ = f(E,...) (job destruction process) 
2
 For the sake of simplicity we consider vacancies to be homogenous. 
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Here, the difference between gross inflow into unemployment and gross outflow deter-
mines the change of unemployment. The flow out of unemployment is determined by 
the matching fünction, whereas the flow into unemployment is described by a 
behaviourial equation in which, besides total employment, real wages and the cyclical 
situation may act as detenninants of job destmction (see equation 1 of the bare-bones-
model of Blanchard and Diamond, 1992). In the model of labour market flows of this 
paper we concentrate on the matching fünction as the main behaviourial equation and 
keep the specification of the job destmction process deliberately very simple. Moreover, 
two other processes, which play a major role in flow models of the labour market, viz. 
the job creation process and labour supply, are specified in a simple manner as well. 
Wage formation is not modelled explicitly so that the model may either describe a 
labour market in disequilibrium or in (unemployment) equilibrium. However, the 
baseline projections of the model, used for the simulation experiments, represent search 
equilibria with constant stocks. 
3. Modelling labour market flows 
Our model distinguisb.es three labour market positions for the working age population: 
the employed, the unemployed and the (voluntary) non-participants (= outside the labour 
force). Figure 3 pictures all relevant flows of persons between these stocks. The stock 
of non-participants is taken as the residual group. Both the inflow into this group and 
the outflow from it, which are demographically determined, are left out of consider-
ation. 
Beside the three positions for the working age population, the figure also shows the 
stock of vacancies and the consequent flows of jobs. These flows of jobs are linked to 
the flows of persons. The model describes at a macro level all labour market flows 
depicted in figure 3. The equations of the model are given in the Annex which also 
contains a list of the main symbols. Our following discussion of the separate equations 
of the model is to clarify its structure. 
Equation (1) is the matching fünction of unemployed and vacancies. In the present 
version of the model this equation only describes the outflow from unemployment of 
those unemployed who find a new job for which a vacancy exists. Of course this is only 
part of the matching process between job seekers and employers. Vacancies are not only 
filled by unemployed, but also by job movers and by non-participants. These other 
matches can also be described by behaviourial equations which have the number of 
vacancies, and the number of relevant job seekers and non-participants as detenninants. 
However, we have not yet specified matching functions for these labour market flows. 
The matching fünction of equation (lb) is based on estimates by Van Ours (1991) for 
The Netherlands and was also included in a simplified previous version of the present 
model by Den Butter and van Ours (1992). Parameter 6 in the matching fünction 
represents duration dependence. In case 0 is equal to unity we have no duration depend-
ence and all unemployed obtain the same weight in the matching fünction. A 6 between 
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1 and O in equation (la) assumes that the probability of unemployed finding a job 
reduces when unemployment duration increases. There are several possible reasons for 
such duration dependence. Firstly, duration dependence on the macro level may be the 
result of duration dependence on the micro level. Because of depreciation of human 
capital long term unemployed lose part of their productive capacity. When the depreci-
ation of human capital outweighs the speed at which the unemployed reduce their 
reservation wage, the chance for a successful matching becomes smaller. Long term 
unemployment can also have a signalling effect, so that employers are inclined not to 
employ long term unemployed, irrespective of their productive capacity. On the other 
hand, duration dependence on the macro level may as well be caused by heterogeneity 
on the micro level. When groups of unemployed have different escape probabilities from 
unemployment, those groups with low escape probabilities will be overrepresented in 
long term unemployment. Both types of duration dependence require different policy 
measures. Van Ours (1992) attempts to separate both sources of duration dependence 
empirically at the macro level. 
Figure 3 Stocks and flows in the model of the labour market 
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Our actual simulation model includes specification (l.b) of the matching function. 
Instead of a gradual decline of the escape probability from unemployment with the 
duration of unemployment, this specification assumes a partition between long term and 
short term unemployed. Here the escape probability for the long term unemployed xL is 
6 xs, where TS is the escape probability for the short term unemployed. 
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The specification of the matching functions is a Cobb-Douglas function with a the 
weight given to the composite unemployment variable in the matching process, and c a 
constant term representing the efficiency of the matching process. Apart from the 
matching function all other behaviourial equations of our model describe behaviour in a 
very simple marmer, namely by relating the relevant flows to scaling variables only. 
These behaviourial equations could be extended in subsequent versions of our model, 
but up to now we have refrained from doing so both because of lack of data and 
because of lack of appropriate empirical examples from the literature3. An advantage of 
keeping the model (relatively) simple is that its working is (rather) transparent. 
According to definition equation (2) the number of vacancies filled by unemployed is 
equal to the number of unemployed who find a new job for which a vacancy exists. 
Equation (3) relates the number of non-participants finding a job for which a vacancy 
exists to the number of vacancies. We already mentioned that this equation can also be 
described by a matching function. The major specification problem for such matching 
function is, however, that only part of the non-participants is relevant for the matching 
process, because the majority of them does not want a (paid) job at all. 
Definition equation (4) makes the amount of vacancies filled by non-participants equal to 
the number of non-participants finding a job for which a vacancy exists. Equation (5) 
defines the gross outflow of vacancies. Besides filled vacancies these are vacancies 
which are scrapped because they cannot be filled. Equation (6) assumes these removed 
vacancies to be a fixed part of the total stock of vacancies. This is in line with the 
model of Blanchard and Diamond (1989) who consider the scrapping of vacancies as 
part of the job destruction process. Equation (7) sets the number of vacancies filled by 
job movers equal to the number of job movers finding a new job for which a vacancy 
exists. 
Equation (8) relates these job movers to the number of vacancies. Again a matching 
function would be an altemative to the present simple specification but in that case we 
should have data on which part of the employed workers is actively looking for another 
job. Equation (9) defines this change in the stock of vacancies as the net result of gross 
inflow and gross outflow of vacancies. The components of gross inflow are differenti-
ated in equation (10). Equation (11) describes the process of job creation which 
generales new vacancies (equation 2 of the bare-bones-model of Blanchard and Dia-
mond, 1992). In the present version of our model we regard it as an autonomous flow, 
so that we can simulate a labour demand shock by an impulse to this variable. Equation 
(12) describes new vacancies which result from quits of job movers. The parameter p^ 
indicates the extent to which job mobility induces new vacancies, so that (l-/t3) repre-
sents the ratio of jobs which disappear after a quit. Equation (13) assumes the same 
ratio for the number of new vacancies of job quitters who become non-participants, on 
the understanding that it makes no difference for the continuation of the job whether the 
3
 Pissarides (1990) provides a theoretical specification for the processes of job 
creation, labour supply and wage formation, which are derived from microeconomic 
behaviour and which imply an unemployment equilibrium. 
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holder of that job quits because he or she did find a new job or because he or she 
wanted to become a non-participant. Equations (12) and (13) may both relate to job 
quitters who would otherwise have been laid off, so that in this interpretation (l-/x3) is 
associated with the job destruction process. 
Equation (14) describes the number of vacancies which emerge when workers lose their 
job and become unemployed. These will mainly be lay-offs, so that the number of 
resulting vacancies is probably small. Therefore nA will be close to zero. 
Equation (15) relates the number of job movers to a newly created job to total employ-
ment. Obviously this simple way of modelling this part of the job creation process 
should be elaborated in a later version of the model. The same holds true for equations 
(16) and (17) according to which total employment determines the number of persons 
who become unemployed and the number of persons who leave their jobs (quits, lay-
offs, retirement) and become non-participants4. 
Equation (18) defines the pool of unemployed. lts net change is equal to gross inflow 
minus gross outflow. Definition equation (19) equates gross inflow into unemployment 
to the sum of the number of workers who lose their jobs and got unemployed and the 
number of non-participants who register as unemployed. The latter variable represente 
the autonomous part of labour supply in the model. Equation (21) gives the components 
of gross outflow from unemployment. The flows from unemployment to employment 
have been described previously, but some unemployed will stop searching and become 
(voluntary) non-participant. Equation (22) relates the fiow of these discouraged unem-
ployed to total unemployment. As an alternative one can think of long term unemploy-
ment as a scale variable. Hence equations (20) and (22) describe the labour supply 
process. Equation (23) relates the number of unemployed who find a newly created job 
to the autonomous inflow of vacancies, so that this flow is linked with the autonomous 
job creation process of the model. As equations (22) and (23) describe outflow from 
unemployment and as we distinguish various duration classes of unemployment in the 
model we are bound to make assumptions about the duration classes from which the 
outflow originates. We assume a uniform distribution over the duration classes for the 
discouraged unemployed and the same distribution as implied by the matching process of 
equation (lb) for those unemployed who take a newly created job. 
Equation (24) defines total employment as the result of gross inflow and gross outflow 
and the stock in the previous period. Equation (25) describes the various components of 
gross inflow into employment, distinguished by the model. When job movers are 
included in gross inflow, they are also to be included in gross outflow in equation (27). 
Equation (26) relates non-participants who take a newly created job to the inflow of new 
vacancies, which provides an other link with the autonomous job creation process. The 
4
 E.g. Blanchard and Diamond (1989) define /i, = (q+T0) with q the quit rate and 
r0 the fraction of jobs that become unproductive and involve lay-offs because of the job 
destruction process. 
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definition of gross outflow from employment in equation (27) completes the model's 
description of all flows of persons and jobs depicted in figure 3. 
As total employment, total unemployment and the stock of vacancies, including the 
respective inflows into, and outflows from these stocks, are fully determined by the 
model, the model implicitly describes escape probabilities and average durations of 
persons staying in these stocks. Hence the model encompasses duration models of search 
theory. However, most empirical duration models using microeconomic data, focus on 
one stock in particular (employment duration, unemployment duration or the duration of 
vacancies) and do not consider the various escape probabilities or hazard functions in a 
consistent framework. This model does, but no simple distribution functions for the 
escape probability result from it. According to the model escape probabilities and 
average durations are time dependent in the model and vary with on all parameter 
values and exogenous flows. Only in very specific circumstances, when all stocks are 
constant (or grow at the same pace) we have time independent distribution functions as 
assumed by duration analysis (see Den Butter and Abbring, 1993, for an analysis of 
unemployment equilibria with heterogenous unemployment). 
Equation (28) defines the escape probability from the first duration class. The number of 
unemployed in this class is equal to the inflow into unemployment (equation 29). 
Equation (30) gives the composition of the higher duration classes and the escape 
probability from these classes. 
The model is specified on a quarterly basis. Rather than estimating the parameters of the 
model, these parameters are set to plausible values, which are partly based on empirical 
results from the literature. We label this procedure model calibration. In this calibration 
procedure we have used the parameters /*, .... /*„ of the model as instrument so that the 
model gives, in a dynamic simulation, good ex post predictions of labour market 
developments in the 1970's and the 1980's. In principle we use the same calibration 
procedure as Den Butter and Van Ours (1992) and therefore we take their parameter 
values for p.u fi2 and /i3 as starting point. For the autonomous inflows V^ and F,,,, no 
data are available from statistical sources so that artificial data have been constructed for 
the series using information on unemployment, employment, vacancies and the flow of 
filled vacancies. These artificial data are in accordance with the equilibrium solution of 
the model, given the observations mentioned above5. The other variables for which no 
data exists are endogenous and determined by the model. 
5
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We have taken four quarter moving averages in order to smoothen incidental shocks in 
the data. 
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Table 1 summarizes the results of several calibration experiments. The table presents 
two yardsticks for the adequacy of the model to describe past developments, namely the 
root mean square prediction error (RMSE), and Theil's inequality coëfficiënt (INEQ). 
The latter provides a measure of the relative deviations of the ex post predictions from 
their realisations. These yardsticks are applied to the projections and realisations of the 
four main endogenous variables of the model, namely vacancies, unemployment, 
employment, and the share of long term unemployment (LU=ULAJs). 
Table 1. Model calibration with selected parameter values 
LU V U E 
RMSE INEQ RMSE INEQ RMSE INEQ RMSE INEQ 
selected specifkation 0.149 0.298 31.8 0.204 95.9 0.109 151 0.0179 
0.149 0.297 32.0 0.206 96.4 0.109 149 0.0177 
0.150 0.299 31.5 0.201 95.3 0.108 153 0.0182 
0.153 0.307 32.8 0.210 94.3 0.106 150 0.0179 
0.146 0.289 31.2 0.199 97.8 0.111 152 0.0181 
0.149 0.298 32.0 0.206 95.9 0.109 152 0.0181 
0.149 0.298 31.6 0.202 96.0 0.109 150 0.0178 
0.154 0.310 36.2 0.235 99.6 0.113 148 0.0176 
0.144 0.285 30.0 0.180 93.3 0.105 163 0.0195 
u* 0.01 0.154 0.311 29.1 0.174 84.1 0.094 197 0.0236 
0.127 0.241 31.3 0.198 117.1 0.136 157 0.0188 
0.172 0.361 32.4 0.209 82.1 0.092 146 0.0173 
0.148 0.294 31.3 0.199 95.2 0.108 153 0.0182 
0.151 0.302 32.5 0.209 96.8 0.110 149 0.0178 
0.152 0.305 30.9 0.195 94.5 0.107 155 0.0185 
0.147 0.292 32.7 0.212 97.2 0.110 147 0.0175 
Explanatory note: the selected specification is p,=0.01, n3=0.01, fi3=0.9, (i4=0.05, 
HS=*0.15, uf=0.01, u7=0.5, ns=0, u9=0.2, pM=0.1, pn**0.4, o=0.5, 6=0.5. RMSE 
means root mean square error; INEQ means Theil's inequality coëfficiënt. The alterna-
tive parameter values in the left hand column are selected in order to illustrate the 
sensitivity of the fit of the model for parameter changes. 
alt. 
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Besides the parameter values for /i,, \L2, H3, those for 0 and a are also equal their 
calibrated values in the restricted model (see Den Butter and Van Ours, 1992). A major 
criterium in our calibration procedure is that the parameters /i4,...,|tu of the seiected 
specification obtain plausible values. The table shows that the sensitivity of the model 
for changes of parameter values, as measured by the fit of a dynamic specification over 
the reference period, is rather small. It indicates that a wide range of parameter values 
would yield a fit about as good as that of the seiected specification. Moreover, no set of 
parameter values is optimal in the sense that it yields the best fit for all observed 
endogenous variables at the same time. Obviously the information contents of the 
available macroeconomic time series data is too poor to allow a proper assessment of all 
parameter values of the model. Additional information using, for instance, 
microeconomic data is needed for such assessment. The sensitivity analysis of the next 
section shows how the working of the model is affected by changes of some crucial 
parameter values. 
4. Effects of demand and supplv shocks 
This section shows the effects of autonomous labour demand and supply shocks by 
means of impulse and sensitivity analyses. The baseline projection is calculated as an 
extrapolation of the model using the equilibrium values of the autonomous variables V^ 
and FK, so that, after an initial period, the baseline reaches a stationary equilibrium 
path. A labour supply shock is represented by an autonomous change of the net inflow 
into unemployment of non-participants. The baseline projection has this net inflow equal 
to the gross inflow Fm, determined by the equilibrium condition, minus outflow into 
non-participation, F,,,, which is according to equation (22) a fixed fraction of the stock 
of unemployed. The impulse projection augments the time path of net inflow of the 
baseline with a positive or negative shock. The reason for giving an impulse to net 
inflow instead of to the (autonomous) gross inflow, is that a change of gross inflow 
induces a change of the stock of unemployed and hence a change of outflow into non-
participation. In that case the impulse projection approaches the equilibrium values of 
the baseline projection, so that a labour supply shock does not have a permanent effect 
because the cumulated change of gross inflow is matched by a cumulated change of 
gross outflow of equal size. A demand shock is modelled in a similar manner by an 
autonomous change of the net inflow of new vacancies. In order to avoid negative 
stocks, the simulated (temporary) impulse is distributed over the four quarters of the 
first year of the simulation period, whereas impulse effects are measured at the end of 
the year. 
Table 2 gives the results of autonomous labour demand and supply shocks according to 
the basic version of the model, which has the parameter values of the calibrated 
specification, and which yields, in accordance with the actual situation in The Nether-
lands, a central projection with equilibrium values of 400,000 unemployed and 50,000 
vacancies. However, in equilibrium the share of long term unemployment (one year or 
more) amounts to 24% of total unemployment, which is rather low in comparison with 
the actual situation. 
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The table shows that, according to this version of the model, a positive demand shock, 
which brings about an initial increase of the number of vacancies, enhances employment 
very much. In the long run (i.e. after 6 years) almost all additional vacancies are filled 
up and unemployment has decreased considerably. We note that the decrease of 
unemployment is smaller than the increase of employment because the positive demand 
Shock induces non-participants to take (newly created) jobs. Long term unemployment 
has come down with over 1 %-point. Comparison of the results of the two blocks at the 
left hand side of table 2 demonstrates that there is substantial symmetry between the 
effects of a positive and a negative demand shock. 
Table 2 The effects of an autonomous change of vacancies (demand shock), and 
of unemployed (supply shock), basic central projection 
Increase of vacancies Increase of unemployed 
after after 
Effects on l y r . 3 yrs. 6 yrs. l yr . 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 44 49 42 2.8 3.5 3.9 
vacancies 14 3 2 -2.7 -2.6 -2.2 
unemployment -23 -26 -20 37 32 27 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > -0.5 -1.5 -1.1 -1.3 1.4 1.2 
12 months (% points) 
Decrease of vacancies Decrease of unemployed 
after after 
Effects on l y r . 3 yrs. 6 yrs. l yr . 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment -45 -49 -43 -3.0 -3.9 -4.2 
vacancies -12 -3 -2 2.9 2.9 2.3 
unemployment 25 28 22 -37 -31 -26 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > 0.5 1.4 1.1 1.5 -1.6 -1.3 
12 months (% points) 
Explanatory note: shocks are represented by an autonomous change of 10,000 in each 
quarter ofthefirst year of the simulation period. 
A positive labour supply shock, which may, for instance, represent the result of a 
stimulative participation policy, gives a different picture. This shock has, according to 
the model, no substantial effect on employment: in the long run the increase of employ-
ment is only about 10% of the additional labour supply. Most new entrants on the 
labour market remain unemployed so that the labour participation rate is not really 
enhanced by such supply policy. As a result of second order effects the sum of the 
effects on employed and unenmloyed after 6 years is smaller than the initial shock of 
40,000 labour years. The share of the long term unenmloyed decreases in the first year 
of the shock because at that time the unemployed new entrants are still short term 
unemployed, but in the long run this share exceeds that of the baseline because most 
new entrants remain unemployed or take jobs of others who become long term unem-
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ployed. Similar to the demand shocks, the positive and negative supply shocks appear to 
be almost symmetrical. 
Table 3 gives the results of positive supply and demand shocks according to a version of 
the model, which has the same parameter values of the basic model, but which yields an 
equilibrium baseline projection with an equal number of vacancies and unemployed 
(100,000). In this situation the effect of a demand shock on employment is of about the 
same size as that of the previous case of a supply surplus on the labour market. On the 
other hand the demand shock now causes a small decrease of unemployment only, 
whereas this decrease is sizable in the previous case. A positive supply shock appears to 
enhance employment considerably when the numbers of unemployed and vacancies are 
in balance. Therefore this simulation pictures a situation in which a stimulative supply 
policy can be useful from the perspective of augmenting labour participation. As the 
effects of negative supply and demand shocks are again almost the mirror images of the 
effects of the positive shocks, these simulation results are not presented in the table. 
Table 3 The effects of an autonomous increase of vacancies (demand 
shock), and of unemployed (supply shock), central projection with 
an equal number of vacancies and unemployed 
Increase of vacancies Increase of unemployed 
after 
Effects on lyr . 3yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 34 43 40 
vacancies 23 7 2 
unemployment -11 -7 -2 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 
12 months (% points) 
after 
l yr . 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
9.7 11.0 8.1 
-9.4 -8.0 -3.3 
28.8 13.6 5.3 
0.2 1.3 0.5 
Explanatory note: shocks are represented by an autonomous increase of 10,000 in each 
quarter ofthefirst year of the simulation period. 
The next simulation considers a situation of low labour market dynamics. The baseline 
projection has in equilibrium the same amount of unemployed (400,000) and vacancies 
(50,000) as the basic central projection of table 2, so that the economy is seemingly 
located at the same point of the UV-curve. However, the parameters of the job 
destruction process (/*,) and outflow to non-participation (ji2 and /*?) are given values 
which are one third of those in the calibrated model (/t, = ^ — 0.003 and /i, = 0.06). 
The resulting shift of the UV-curve is offset by a reduction of the efficiency constant c. 
The low level of labour market dynamics is reflected in the share of long term unem-
ployed which is 69% of total unemployment in the present baseline projection as 
compared to 24% in the basic projection. The simulation results of table 4 prove that a 
positive labour supply shock is less effective for the enhancement of employment in the 
case of low labour market dynamics than when the same stock of unemployed and 
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vacancies concurs with relatively large labour market flows. In other words, a stimula-
tive labour supply policy will, ceteris paribus, be less successful when the share of long 
term unemployment is high than when there are only a few long term unemployed. The 
effects of a negative supply shock again appear to mirror those of a positive supply 
shock almost completely. 
Table 4 The effects of an autonomous change of unemployed (supply 
shock), central projection with low labour market dynamics 
Increaseof 
after 
' unemployed Decrease 
after 
of unemployed 
Effects on lyr. 3yrs. 6 yrs. lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 1.2 2.3 2.9 -1.3 -2.5 -3.1 
vacancies -1.2 -1.7 -1.5 1.2 1.8 1.6 
unemployment 38.6 35.3 31.7 -38.6 -34.9 -31.1 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > -5.5 0.8 0.8 6.5 -0.9 -0.8 
12 months (% poinu) 
Explanatory note: shocks are represented by an autonomous change of 10,000 in each 
quarter ofthefirst year of the simulation period. 
The following simulations investigate the incidence of persistence of unemployment in 
case of labour supply shocks. An autonomous change of net inflow into unemployment 
in the first year of the simulation period is foliowed by an opposite change of equal size 
in the fourth year of the simulation period. This string of shocks may represent a 
cyclical impact on labour supply, or altematively a stimulative labour supply policy 
which is maintained for a short period only. The upper part of table 5 gives the 
simulation results for the basic central projection, and the lower part of the table reports 
the results for the corresponding projection with low labour market dynamics. Although 
this string of opposite shocks hardly affects the level of employment, indeed it causes 
some persistence of unemployment, which is somewhat higher in the short run than in 
the long run. Unemployment comes down when a positive shock is foliowed by a 
negative shock and goes up vice versa. It illustrates mat a temporary stimulative labour 
supply policy which intends to enhance labour participation, may cause a reduction of 
the unemployment rate, without really affecting labour participation. The table shows 
that the persistence of unemployment is slightly larger in the basic situation with a 
relatively low rate of long term unemployment than in the case of a low level of labour 
market dynamics with a lot of long term unemployed. 
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Table 5 The effects of two successive supply shocks, two alternative 
projections with the same UV-equilibrium (400,000 unemployed 
and 50,000 vacancies) 
a. hasic central projection 
Increase/decrease of unemployed Decrease/increase o: f unemployed 
after after 
Effects on lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yn. lyr. 3yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 0.9 0.4 0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 
vacancies 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 
unemployment -6.6 -5.2 -4.3 7.2 5.8 4.8 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > 2.9 -0.3 -0.2 -2.8 0.3 0.2 
12 months (% pointe) 
b. central projection with low labour market dynamics 
Increase/decrease of unemployed Decrease/increase of unemployed 
after after 
Effects on lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs. lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 1.3 0.5 0.5 -1.4 -0.6 -0.5 
vacancies -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 
unemployment -4.6 -3.5 -3.1 5.0 3.8 3.4 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > 6.9 -0.1 -0.1 -6.7 0.1 0.1 
12 months (% pointe) 
Explanatory note: thefirst shock is represented by an autonomous change of 10,000 in 
each quarter ofthefirst year of the simulation period and the second shock by a similar 
change in the fourth year of the simulation period. Effects are calculated from this 
fourth year onwards. 
All previous simulations assume duration dependent unemployment according to which 
the weight of the long term unemployed in the matching function is half of that of the 
short term unemployed. In order to investigate the relationship between the degree of 
duration dependence and the persistence of unemployment in case of a string of labour 
supply shocks, table 6 gives the results for the case of low duration dependence (long 
term unemployed have a weight of 0.9 in the matching function) and for the case of 
high duration dependence (a weight of only 0.1 for the long term unemployed). The 
baseline projections for both cases have their equilibrium at 400,000 unemployed and 
50,000 vacancies so that they seemingly are at the same point of the UV-curve. As the 
largest effects of changes of the degree of duration dependence are to be expected when 
there are a lot of long term unemployed, these baseline projections are taken as variants 
on the central projection with low labour market dynamics, for which the effects of a 
string of supply shocks are reported in the lower part of table 5. Indeed, we see that 
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these results for the model with $ = 0.5 lie between the results for the models with 6 = 
0.9 and with 0 = 0.1 of table 6. 
Table 6 The effects of two successive supply shocks, two altemative 
projections with the same UV-equilibrium (400,000 unemployed 
and 50,000 vacancies) 
a. central projection with low duration dependent unemployment (6 = 0.9) 
Increase/decrease of unemployed Decrease/increase of unemployed 
after after 
Effects on lyr. 3yrs. 6 yrs. lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 1.6 0.6 0.5 -1.7 -0.7 -0.5 
vacancies -0.8 0.2 0.2 0.9 -0.2 -0.2 
unemployment -4.7 -3.8 -3.4 5.1 4.1 3.6 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > 7.1 -0.1 -0.1 •6.9 0.1 0.1 
12 months (% poinu) 
b. central projection with highly duration dependent unemployment (6 = 0.1) 
Increaae/decrease of unemployed Decrease/increase of unemployed 
after 
Effects on lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
employment 0.4 0.1 0.4 
vacancies 0.7 0.5 0.1 
unemployment -4.5 -2.6 -2.5 
(x 1,000) 
% unempl. > 6.6 -0.0 -0.1 
12 months (% pointe) 
after 
lyr. 3 yrs. 6 yrs. 
-0.6 -0.3 -0.5 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.1 
5.2 3.3 3.1 
-6.5 0.1 0.1 
Explanatory note: thefirst shock is represented by an autonomous change of10,000 in 
each quarter ofthefirst year of the simulation period and the second shock by a similar 
change in the fourth year of the simulation period. Effects are calculated from this 
fourth year onwards. 
However, the persistence of unemployment appears not to depend very much on the 
degree of duration dependence. The decrease of unemployment due to a positive labour 
supply shock foliowed by a negative supply shock is somewhat higher in the case of low 
duration dependence than in the case of high duration dependence. Similarly an 
autonomous decrease of the infïow into unemployment foliowed by an increase of the 
same size leads to a somewhat higher unemployment rate when escape probabilities for 
long term unemployed are high as compared to those for short term unemployed than in 
the case of low escape probabilities. So we find a negative, albeit rather weak, relation-
ship between duration dependence and persistence of unemployment. This is somewhat 
against our intuition as it contrasts the predictions of the insider-outsider theory which 
associates high persistence of unemployment with high duration dependence. Yet we 
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note that the wage formation process described by the insider-outsider theory relates to a 
quite different mechanism than the search process underlying the flow approach 
modelled here. Moreover, our simulations refer to the comparative staties of alternative 
situations at the same point of the UV-curve, and we do not consider the effects of 
autonomous changes of duration dependence on the persistence of employment. Such 
experiments would not fit into the comparative staties framework of our equilibrium 
simulations. 
5. Conclusions 
The analysis of this paper is inspired by the low labour participation rate in The 
Netherlands and by policy proposals to enhance labour participation and employment by 
encouraging labour supply. According to the traditional model of a homogeneous labour 
market an autonomous labour supply shock does not lead to more employment in the 
case of labour market disequilibrium with excess supply and a fixed wage. On the other 
hand a flow model of the labour market allows for a positive employment effect of an 
autonomous positive labour supply shock in that case, even when the wage formation 
process is left out of consideration. The effect of such supply shock depends upon the 
position and the shape of the reduced form UV-curve, which is determined by the 
specification of the flow model. Unemployment equilibrium theory has established that 
shifts of the UV-curve can be caused by efficiency and parameter changes of the 
matching process, by changes of the job destruction process (matched in equilibrium by 
changes of the job supply process), by changes of the steady state employment growth 
rate and by changes of the duration dependence of unemployment (see e.g. Pissarides, 
1990 and Den Butter and Abbring, 1993). 
The dynamic model for the Dutch labour market, used in this paper to simulate the 
effects of labour supply and demand shocks, is an empirical offspring of the theoretical 
models of the flow approach to labour market modelling. The model endogenises all 
possible flows between the stocks of unemployed, employed, vacancies and the non-
participants on the labour market at the macro level, but its specification of the model is 
kept as simple as possible. The only fully fledged behaviourial equation is that for the 
matching process of unemployed and vacancies. The other relevant flows are described 
as fixed proportions of scale variables. 
Impulse simulations show that the model reproduces a number of mechanisms implicit in 
theoretical models of the flow approach. According to the model a positive labour 
supply shock enhances employment and a string of positive and negative supply shocks 
of equal size is shown to cause unemployment persistence. The extent of unemployment 
persistence appears to depend upon the degree of unemployment duration dependence 
and upon the level of labour market dynamics. However, the model, which has its 
parameter values calibrated according to the Dutch situation in the 1970's and 1980's, 
shows that the effects described above are rather small when calculated empirically. 
Large specification changes only induce small differences in the degree of unemploy-
ment persistence. The employment effects of an autonomous increase of labour supply 
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appear to be so modest that a stimulative labour supply policy in order to enhance 
labour participation can be regarded as ineffective and should be accompanied by a 
labour demand policy. A more extensive sensitivity analysis and an extension of the 
model with more sophisticated specifications for the major behaviourial relations 
(including the wage formation process) may amend this view on the empirical relevance 
of the flow approach. 
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The model 
(1) F ^ = f (V,U) (matching function) 
(la) = c V (U')a (genera! specification) 
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where V' =£t/^(ö,)k) 
* - i 
o<0<;i 
Here the weight of each duration class g(0, k) depends on the duration depend-
ence parameter 6 and on the length of a spell of unemployment k. In case of 
negative duration dependency this weight falls with the length of the unemploy-
ment spell k. 
(lb) F m = c V 1 _ a ( Us + evj* (model specification) 
(2) VO„ = F„„ 
(3) F ^ =
 Ms V 
(4) VO, = F „ 
(5) VO = VOu + VO, + VOe + VOB 
(6) VOB = M6 V 
(7) VO. = F w 
(8) F ^ = M 7 V 
(9) V = V., + VI - VO 
(10) VI = VIj + VI. + VI., + VI^ 
(11) VIj = autonomous 
(12) n -ihF^ + Fj) 
(13) VI. = ^ F„ 
(14) VU = M 4 F M 
(15) F ^ = f* E 
(16) F . - f c E 
(17) F w = MI E 
(18) U = U., + UI - UO 
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(19) UI - F . + F.. 
(20) F,,, = autonomous 
(21) UO - F^ + F „ + F„ 
(22) F . = * U 
where the outflow from unemployment has a uniform distribution 
over the duration classes. 
(23) F ^ = M,O VI, 
where the outflow from unemployment has the same distribution 
over the duration classes as the outflow because of the matching 
process of equation ( l b ) . 
(24) E = E., + EI - E O 
(25) EI = F ^ + F w + F M + F„„ ( + F w + FKj) 
(26) FK J = Mn V^ 
(27) EO = Fw + F . (+ F w + F ^ 
(28) (genera! specification) 
T1>( = UO / U ' 
(28') (specification used in the model) 
r s = UO / (Us + 0UJ 
(29) U 1 > ( = UI 
(30) (general specification) 
Uk,, = (1-Xk-i.t) Ut,,,.! where 
**,, = *i.t g (#» k) 
(30') (specification used in the model) 
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TL = ÖTS 
List of svmbols 
Flows of persons 
Flow from x to y (x,y = e,u,n) with, when relevant, z=j in case of newly 
created jobs and k=v in case of vacancies) 
Workers who become unemployed by loosing their jobs. 
Workers leaving their job and the labour force. 
Job movers who find a new job for which no (registered) vacancy exists. 
Job movers who find a new job by ülling a vacancy. 
Unemployed who find a new job by rilling a vacancy. 
Unemployed who find a new job for which no (registered) vacancy exists. 
Non-participants (outside the labour force) who find a new job for which no 
(registered) vacancy exists. 
Non-participants who find a job by rilling a vacancy. 
Unemployed leaving the labour force. 
Non-participants who register as unemployed. 
Flows of jobs 
VIj New vacancies. 
VI.,, New vacancies because of lay-offs (and quits) of workers who become unem-
ployed. 
VL. New vacancies because of job mobility: i.e. workers finding an other job. 
VL^ , New vacancies because of quits (and lay-offs) of workers who leave the labour 
force. 
VOu Vacancies filled by unemployed. 
VO,, Vacancies filled by non-participants. 
VOe Vacancies filled by job movers. 
VOn Removed vacancies 
Stocks 
E Employment 
U Unemployment 
V Vacancies 
Other symbols 
T l t Escape probability of unemployed from the first duration class 
x t t Escape probability of unemployed from the k-th duration class 
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F« 
F -
F», 
F-j 
F M 
F . 
F» 
TS Escape probabihty of short term unempioyed 
TL Escape probabihty of long term unempioyed 
U t t Number of unempioyed in the k-th duration class 
6 Duration dependence parameter 
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